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1. Introduction
The issue of input speciﬁcity arises when two industries are vertically linked.
We assume that a set of upstream ﬁrms supplies an input to an equal number
of downstream ﬁrms. Each downstream ﬁrm produces a diﬀerentiated consumer
good and uses a diﬀerentiated intermediate good. Then each input supplier faces
the following choice. It can either produce an input that is specially adapted to
the requirements of a given buyer, or it can produce a generic or standardized
intermediate good that can be used without much penalty by downstream ﬁrms
other than the intended buyer.
This issue is important for several reasons. Firstly, it entails a technological
trade-oﬀ. As was acknowledged by RIORDAN and WILLIAMSON (1985), spe-
cialization of the input reduces the marginal production cost of the buying ﬁrm,
although it determines a diﬀerent cost directly related with the level of input
speciﬁcity. As McLAREN (2000) remarked, this cost has to do with the diﬃcult
adaptation of the specialized input to the needs of downstream ﬁrms other than
the intended buyer.
Secondly, input specialization can lead to inequalities among downstream ﬁrms.
If most upstream ﬁrms specialize their inputs to a subset of consumer goods ﬁrms,
the remaining buying ﬁrms will have to incur adaptation costs of the input that
will lead them to produce a smaller amount of output.
Thirdly, input speciﬁcity can lead to vertical integration. This can occur for
two diﬀerent reasons. The specialization of the input creates an incentive for the
continuation in time of a relationship between the seller and the buyer of the input.
Incomplete contracts and transaction costs lead to a governance of this relation-Input Specificity and Location 3
ship through common property instead of a market arrangement (RIORDAN and
WILLIAMSON, 1985). This can be seen in terms of a bilateral relationship be-
tween a seller and a buyer, or in the context of the interdependence of the integra-
tion decisions taken by several upstream and downstream ﬁrms in vertically-linked
industries (McLAREN, 2000; GROSSMAN and HELPMAN, 2002). But vertical
integration can also occur for strategic reasons. An upstream ﬁrm can decide to
adapt the input to the requirements of a given buyer. By doing so, it undertakes
not to supply the input to other downstream ﬁrms, thus raising their costs. This
beneﬁts the downstream ﬁrm that buys the specialized input, and this externality
can be internalized if the upstream ﬁrm merges with the targeted input buyer
(CHOI and YI, 2000; CHURCH and GANDAL, 2000).
In this paper, the issue of vertical integration will be left to one side and the
focus of our attention will be on the technological aspects of the decision to spe-
cialize in terms of input. Just as HOTELLING (1929) and D’ASPREMONT,
GABSZWICZ and THISSE (1979) did for the horizontal diﬀerentiation of a con-
sumer good, input speciﬁcity will be modelled as following from "site speciﬁcity".
JOSKOW (1987) deﬁned the site speciﬁcity of an input through two complemen-
tary causes: (1) the upstream and the downstream ﬁrms are co-located or (2) the
average distances and the unit transport costs among the buyers and the sellers
are high.
HELSLEY and STRANGE (2004) related the site speciﬁcity of an input to
"market thickness". As the number of downstream ﬁrms increases, the average
distance between each input supplier and each input buyer decreases. The agglom-
eration of ﬁrms decreases input speciﬁcity. Site speciﬁcity can also be modelled by
means of a two- dimensional space, as was done by GROSSMAN and HELPMANInput Specificity and Location 4
(2002), where each downstream ﬁrm uses a diﬀerentiated input with an address
within a certain circumference. Each input supplier is deﬁned by a location inside
the circle with two coordinates, deﬁned by the radius that joins the location to
the center of the circle and to a point on the circumference. This point on the
circumference deﬁnes the diﬀerentiated input in which the upstream ﬁrm is rela-
tively specialized. The distance between the location and the center of the circle
measures the degree of specialization.
In this paper, we will try to relate location and transport costs as causes of
the site speciﬁcity of an input. We will follow the approach of the Launhardt
model that was presented by DOS SANTOS FERREIRA and THISSE (1996): for
diﬀerent location patterns, the ﬁrms ﬁrst choose transport rates endogenously and
then they compete in the product market. Our approach is also closely related
with DOS SANTOS FERREIRA and ZUSCOVITCH (1995). Each ﬁrm can choose
between manufacturing a "light" (ﬂexible) product at a high production cost, or a
"heavy" (specialized) product with a low production cost but a high transport cost
(adaptation cost), which the ﬁrm must incur if it sells the product in a diﬀerent
location (to a diﬀerent buyer). As ANDERSON and DE PALMA (1996) remarked,
this choice amounts to an option for the input supplier between competing locally,
i.e. mainly serving a local buyer, and competing globally, where the ﬁrm aims to
supply clients in diﬀerent locations.
Three main ﬁndings follow from our analysis. The ﬁr s ti st h a tt h el o c a t i o n
and transport cost factors of site speciﬁcity are closely related. Firms will be
more likely to produce "heavy" inputs if they are co-located with their buyers
than otherwise. In each case, transport costs will be higher when the returns to
specialization in terms of production cost reduction are higher. The second is thatInput Specificity and Location 5
for moderate returns to specialization there will be multiple equilibria in transport
rates, while there will be a single equilibrium for extreme values. The third is that
the intermediate equilibria will be symmetric in the event of the co-location of
input suppliers and buyers and asymmetric if the upstream ﬁrms cluster in one
location. This result is reminiscent of DOS SANTOS FERREIRA and THISSE
(1996).
In section 2. the model is presented. In subsection 2.1. the assumptions are de-
ﬁned and the game structure is described. In subsection 2.2. the case is presented
where each upstream ﬁrm locates separately with each downstream ﬁrm. In sub-
section 2.3. the other polar case is presented where the input suppliers co-locate.
The conclusions are drawn in section 3..
2. The model
2.1. Assumptions and game structure
The model describes a spatial economy that obeys the following assumptions:
1. The economy is composed of two regions, A and B,e a c hw i t ht h es a m e
number n of consumers. Through normalization, we have n =1 .T h e
distance between the regions, δ, is also normalized to δ =1 .
2. Each consumer has an inverse linear demand function p = a − bx.F o rt h e
sake of simplicity, it will be assumed that a = b =1 .
3. Two downstream ﬁrms, D1 in region A,a n dD2 in region B, produce a
homogenous consumer good under local monopoly. The consumer good is
supposed to be non-tradable: the transport cost of the ﬁnal good is so highInput Specificity and Location 6
that, for each downstream ﬁrm, it is more proﬁtable to charge the monopoly
price than to undercut the competitor.
4. Each downstream ﬁrm uses one unit of an input in order to produce one unit
of the ﬁnal good. The input price is the only marginal production cost of
the downstream ﬁrm, which does not incur any ﬁxed costs.
5. Two upstream ﬁrms, U1 and U2, produce and deliver a homogeneous in-
termediate good to the ﬁnal producers, D1 and D2. The upstream ﬁrms
compete in quantities sold to each downstream ﬁrm.
6. Each upstream ﬁrm Ui (i =1 ,2) chooses its transport rate ti in the distance
between the regions. The marginal production cost of the input is a de-
creasing function of the transport rate, so that the production of a "lighter"
input entails a higher marginal production cost. The input supplier trades oﬀ
the spatial ﬂexibility of the intermediate good against productive eﬃciency.
The relationship is linear, so that the marginal production cost of the input
produced by ﬁrm Ui is given by









β ∈ (0,1)Input Specificity and Location 7






means that the transport cost and the production cost can take zero
values, which is not realistic, but is admitted for the sake of simplicity. α ∈ (0,1)
ensures that the production cost does not exceed each consumer’s reservation
price (equal to 1, according to assumption 2). β ∈ (0,1) ensures that the total
marginal cost (production plus transport) of each upstream ﬁrm in the distant
market increases with the transport rate.
With these assumptions, a noncooperative game with three stages is mod-
elled. This game is inspired by the case of vertically-linked industries in a succes-
sive Cournot oligopoly, where ﬁrms ﬁrst select the kind of product diﬀerentiation
for given values of the adaptation costs of the inputs, as presented in BELLE-
FLAMME and TOULEMONDE (2003). However, in our game, the locations of
the ﬁrms are assumed to be given and the transport rates are endogenous. Two
diﬀerent patterns of locations of the upstream ﬁrms are considered and compared:
"site speciﬁcity", where each upstream ﬁrm locates alongside a diﬀerent input
buyer (see Figure 1); and "co-location", where both upstream ﬁrms cluster close
to the same downstream ﬁrm (see Figure 2).
The game has the following stages:Input Specificity and Location 8
Figure 2: Co-location of input suppliers
First Stage :F i r m sU1 and U2 select the transport rates t1 and t2.
Second Stage :F i r mU1 chooses the quantities q1a and q1b and Firm U2 chooses
the quantities q2a and q2b of the intermediate good to be sold to the down-
stream ﬁrms in regions A and B.
Third Stage :D o w n s t r e a mﬁrms D1 and D2 choose quantities of the consumer
good x1 and x2 to be sold in regions A and B respectively.
2.2. The case of the site speciﬁcity of the input
In this case, it is assumed that each upstream ﬁrm locates in a diﬀerent re-
gion alongside a consumer good producer (see Figure 1) This corresponds to the
Williamsonian concept of the "site speciﬁcity" of an asset. It will be shown that
this kind of site speciﬁcity implies a specialized adaptation of the input to the
needs of the local buyer, in the sense that the upstream ﬁrm will ﬁnd it proﬁtable
to produce a "heavy" input at a low production cost and sell it to the local buying
ﬁrm.
We seek to solve the three-stage game by backward induction in order to ﬁnd
a subgame perfect equilibrium. The proﬁt functions of ﬁrms D1 and D2 in theInput Specificity and Location 9
third stage are:
πD
1 (x1,wa) = [(1 − x1) − wa]x1 (1)
πD
2 (x2,wb) = [(1 − x2) − wb]x2 (2)
where wa and wb are the delivered prices of the input in regions A and B.I ft h e s e










(1 − wb) (4)
In the second stage, let q1a,q1b,q2a,q2b be the quantities of the input sold
by the upstream ﬁrms U1 and U2 to the downstream ﬁrms in regions A and B.










(1 − wb) (6)
If these equalities are solved in relation to wa and wb,w eo b t a i ni n v e r s ed e -
mands for the input in each region:
wa = 1 − 2(q1a+q2a) (7)
wb = 1 − 2(q1b+q2b) (8)Input Specificity and Location 10
The proﬁt functions ﬁrm U1 and ﬁrm U2 are:
πU
1 (q1a,q1b,q2a,q2b,t 1)=[ w a −(α − βt1)]q1a+[wb−t1 − (α − βt1)]q1b
(9)
πU
2 (q1a,q1b,q2a,q2b,t 2)=[ w a −t2 − (α − βt2)]q2a+[wb−(α − βt2)]q2b
(10)
where wa and wb are deﬁned by 7 and 8. The Cournot equilibrium outputs in


































































We will assume henceforth that these outputs are positive for any values of the
transport rates. It is shown in the Appendix that a suﬃcient condition for this to





This condition means that the marginal production cost of each upstream ﬁrm
should be sensitive enough to the variation of its transport rate.
Plugging the outputs 11 into the proﬁt functions 9 and 10, we obtain the proﬁtInput Specificity and Location 11














































































































































The second partial derivative of the proﬁt function of each upstream ﬁrm in











β (1 − β) (15)
for i =1 ,2. It can be easily seen that the second partial derivative 15 is positive for
β ∈ (0,1), thus ensuring that the proﬁt function of each upstream ﬁrm is strictly
convex in its transport rate. Hence the proﬁt function of each input supplier
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w.l.g.Input Specificity and Location 12
(t∗
1,t ∗
2)=( 0 ,0) is a Nash equilibrium of the ﬁrst-stage game if and only if:
πU















Following 13 and 14, these conditions are both equivalent to
α ≤
β (1 − 2β)
1 − β
(16)








is a Nash equilibrium of the ﬁrst-stage

































These conditions are equivalent to
α ≥
β (2β − 1)
2β
2 − β − 1
(17)
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2 (0,0) ⇔ α ≥
β (1 − 2β)
1 − β
(18)
By plotting 12, 16 and 17 together in the (α,β) space, it is possible to deﬁne
the regions where each type of equilibrium holds in Figure 3. It is clear thatInput Specificity and Location 13
Figure 3: Equilibria in transport rates in the site speciﬁcity case
conditions 18 are incompatible, so that asymmetric equilibria do not exist.
Figure 3 shows that equilibrium transport rates are minimal when the para-
meters α and β are small and that they are maximal otherwise. For intermediate
values of the parameters, both symmetric equilibria coexist. Basically, the equilib-
rium with high transport rates occurs if the returns to specialization of the input
(as measured by β)a r eh i g h .
2.3. The case of co-location of the input suppliers
Let us assume now that the input suppliers are clustered in region A, so that
the spatial pattern of the economy is as described by Figure 2. In this case, the
inputs are not speciﬁc to the location of the downstream ﬁrms.Input Specificity and Location 14
Solving the game by backward induction, it is clear that the third-stage game
is identical to the one that was described in subsection 2.2., so that the proﬁt
functions of the downstream ﬁrms are given by 1 and by 2 and the equilibrium
outputs of the consumer good are expressed by 3 and 4.
In the second stage, the inverse demand functions of the input in the two
regions are still given by 7 and 8. But the proﬁt functions of the upstream ﬁrms
now become
πU
1 (q1a,q1b,q2a,q2b,t 1)=[ w a −(α − βt1)]q1a+[wb−t1 − (α − βt1)]q1b
(19)
πU
2 (q1a,q1b,q2a,q2b,t 2)=[ w a −(α − βt2)]q2a+[wb−t2 − (α − βt2)]q2b
(20)



































































If we plug the outputs 21 into the proﬁt functions 19 and 20, we obtain theInput Specificity and Location 15



















































































































































If we compute the second partial derivatives of the proﬁt functions of the input
suppliers in relation to their own transport cost rates, we conclude that they are
still given by 15, so that each proﬁt function is convex in its own transport rate.






. In what follows, we check the possible Nash equilibria in transport
rates.
Clearly, there will be a Nash equilibrium (0,0) if and only if
πU















These conditions are equivalent to
α ≤
β (1 − 2β)
1 − β
(24)Input Specificity and Location 16
which is the same as 16.






will be a Nash equilibrium in the ﬁrst-stage game














































































Conditions 24, 25 and 26 are plotted in Figure 4.
Comparing Figure 4 with Figure 3, it is clear that, as in the case of site speci-
ﬁcity, in the case of co-location of the suppliers, the equilibrium transport rates
will be maximal if the returns to specialization (as measured by β) are high and
they will be minimal if these returns are low. However, there are diﬀerences be-
tween the two cases. Firstly, the region where transport rates are maximal is muchInput Specificity and Location 17
Figure 4: Equilibrium transport rates in the case of co-location of input suppliersInput Specificity and Location 18
smaller in the case of co-location of suppliers when compared with the case of site
speciﬁcity. Secondly, for intermediate values of β, we now have multiple asym-
metric equilibria instead of multiple symmetric equilibria. In this case, one of the
upstream ﬁrms chooses to basically supply the local buyer, while the other one
selects a low transport rate in order to serve downstream ﬁr m si nb o t hr e g i o n s .
3. Concluding remarks
The analysis has enabled us to draw several conclusions. The ﬁrst, unsurprising
ﬁnding is that specialization occurs if its returns in terms of production cost reduc-
tion are high. This is more likely to occur if each upstream ﬁrm is close to a buyer
than if they cluster in one single location. The second conclusion is that there
will be one single equilibrium in transport rates if the returns to specialization are
extreme (either too low or too high), but there will be multiple equilibria if these
returns are intermediate. In this case, the multiple equilibria will be symmetric
i nt h ec a s eo fs i t es p e c i ﬁcity, but asymmetric in the case of co-location of input
suppliers. Finally, while the output of the consumer good will be the same in both
regions in the case of site speciﬁcity, it will be diﬀerent in the case of co-location
of input suppliers. In this latter case, the output of the consumer good is higher
in the region where the input suppliers are located, if at least one of the upstream
ﬁrms specializes its intermediate good. These conclusions are reminiscent of (al-
though not entirely coincident) DOS SANTOS FERREIRA and THISSE (1996).
The conclusions can be summarized by saying that the site speciﬁcity of the input,
following from the joint location of an upstream and a downstream ﬁrm, leads to
its specialization as a result of the choice of high transport rates by the suppliers.
This paper has a rather speciﬁc ﬂavor. Two extensions can be contemplated.Input Specificity and Location 19
The ﬁrst one is the endogenisation of the location choice made by the ﬁrms, which
determines the degree of input speciﬁcity. If this is done, it becomes necessary to
explain why the upstream ﬁrms may co-locate, by means of some kind of agglomer-
ation economy. The second extension would be to consider diﬀerent values for the
distance between the regions, δ, instead of a single value. Following ANDERSON
and DE PALMA (1996), it is expected that a high value of δ will by itself lead to
a higher degree of localization of competition in the input market and to a higher
input speciﬁcity.




We deal ﬁrst with the case of site speciﬁcity presented in subsection 2.2.. From
11, it is clear that q1b(t1,t 2) ≥ 0 and q2a(t1,t 2) ≥ 0 are equivalent respectively
to
t1 ≤




α + βt1 − 1
2β − 2
If the relations A.1 are taken as equalities, they deﬁne two decreasing functions







Clearly, a suﬃcient condition for each upstream ﬁrm to be active in its distant
market, for any transport rate that may be selected by the competing upstreamInput Specificity and Location 20










Then the case of co-location of the input suppliers, which is dealt with in subsec-
tion 2.3., is examined. From 21, it is clear that q1b(t1,t 2) ≥ 0 and q2b(t1,t 2) ≥ 0
mean respectively that
t1 ≤




α − t1 + βt1 − 1
2β − 2
If relations A.3 are met as equalities, they deﬁne two increasing functions. The







Clearly, a suﬃcient condition for each upstream ﬁrm to be active in the distant
market B, for any transport rate that may be selected by the competitor, is that











A . 5i sl e s sb i n d i n gt h a nα ≤
β
2, which is therefore a suﬃcient condition forInput Specificity and Location 21
each upstream ﬁrm to be active in its distant market for any transport rate that
may be selected by the competitor.
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